THE IRREFUTABILITY OF MATERIALISM – by Lev Chestov

     I shall say it openly and right from the start: no one has ever refuted materialism. All the objections the opponents of materialism have raised relate not to materialism itself but to the arguments invoked for its defense. To be sure, it is not difficult to destroy these arguments. But are other metaphysical systems in a better position in this respect? It is true that materialism takes the fate of its arguments very much to heart, being convinced - no one knows why - that it must share their fate. In general, it is too scrupulous and, despite its apparent robustness, more nervous than is appropriate to a philosophical theory. It suffices for its opponents to call it "metaphysical" for it immediately to blanch with fear; it believes that all is lost. Not at all! Even if materialism should be called metaphysical, this would not in any way change its nature. And I do not think that the idealists would have an easier job if materialism made use of its rights as a metaphysics.

     But the chief argument against materialism is that it admits the possibility of miraculous transformations, in the genre of Ovid's metamorphoses. Inanimate matter is suddenly transformed into spirit. This objection greatly troubles the materialists, more so than the former objection; they try to escape the reproach of credulity that is thrown at them, and for this purpose seek to replace "suddenly" with "gradually." To be sure, the defense is a sorry one. Their perceptive opponents very easily discover the fatal "suddenly" which the "gradually" conceals. But if I were a materialist, sudden transformations would not embarrass me at all. On the contrary, I would myself insist upon them and so disarm my opponents. Yes, there are sudden metamorphoses, perhaps not of every kind but of a certain kind only. It may also be that anything whatsoever can come from anything whatsoever. What follows from this? Reason does not understand the suddenness? But has materialism bound itself to everything comprehensible to reason? Does the fact that a thing is incomprehensible or even irrational give us the right to refuse to recognize it? Many of the things that in fact exist are incomprehensible to reason. It also does not understand how atoms coming together can form an ape or a rational man.

     So materialism could answer. But the materialists, I am certain, will never speak thus. They also woo reason, which they consider to have been born of atoms and regard as perishable; and they flatter it just as much as their opponents, the idealists, who believe reason to be a primal and eternal principle. And that is why the materialists lay quite as much value on the possibility of demonstrating their truth by rational arguments as on the truth itself. It is clear that under these conditions they can arrive at nothing. To demonstrate the truth of materialism is impossible; and if one admits that demonstrability constitutes the conditio sine qua non (necessary condition) of truth materialism finds itself in a bad way. Its opponents understand this very well, and that is why they speak not of materialism but of the rights of materialism before the tribunal of reason. But this procedure is obviously inadmissible and even dishonest. Before the tribunal of reason every metaphysics, whether it be idealist or materialist, will be in the wrong, for at a certain moment in its development it must rely on the incomprehensible, i.e., what is unacceptable to reason - as on something given. So, then, if materialism would be invulnerable, it must renounce all argumentation whatsoever. Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas (thus I wish, thus I command, my will is reason enough). It is time to understand that only that philosophy which dares to be arbitrary will succeed in breaking its way through.

     Will the materialists follow my advice? I think not. It is probable that they will prefer to meet the idealists halfway, for the effort of the idealists, who try to root out of reality all miracles and everything unexpected, is much closer to them than the conceptions of materialism. Freedom always terrifies men who have become accustomed to thinking that their reason is above everything in the world. I would also certainly not be mistaken in making the contrary assumption: if the idealists were obliged to choose, they would surely agree to accept matter rather than arbitrariness as the supreme principle of the universe.